The question of sociological truth-finding is posed in the light of the view that logical formalizations, along with other arguments, only acquire relevance in illocutionary contexts, where it is not so much the abstract correctness of a sentence as the stating of it that counts. In order to become a counterfactual an argument requires its antecedent to be recognized as being contrary to the 'facts'. To this extent there is a clear link with 'reality' or with a view of the (...) world that is taken as factually given. Social science develops on the basis not only of generalizations but also of historical facts and political requirements. The question arises: in terms of what world-view or purpose can we unambiguously declare a conditional to be a counterfactual - and a significant or non-trivial one at that? Further, can Elster's clarifications help identify political agents and the proper entities within and through which political action is performed? Finally, the problem-solving capacity of the concept of closeness of one possible world to another or to the actual world, especially with regard to counterfactuals and causality, is questioned. (shrink)

In the past 15 years, influential concepts from geography, social, cultural and communication studies have been proposed that conceptualize (everyday) space in the digital age - such as the concepts of 'code/space', 'datafied space', 'atmospheres' and 'hybrid spaces'. These deliver important contributions to theorizing the active role of data, codes, and algorithms, as well as bodies, embodiment, and affects in producing space. Yet, they consider less the role of practices, social intra-actions and difference, as well as more-than-human actants and contexts (...) beyond technologies. In this article, the authors develop the cON/FFlating spaces concept as a link between relational, more-than-human, more-than-representational, posthumanist, and (post-)feminist conceptualizations of (everyday) space. Using Karen Barad's 'diffractive methodology', data and findings from three research projects are read through different theoretical-conceptual approaches - among others Barad's concepts of 'entanglements', 'intra-actions' and 'diffraction' as well as Doreen Massey's 'multiple historicities'. Building on this, we propose 8 theses on cON/FFlating spaces. These discuss the role of practices, power, technologies, non-linear, open and multiple historicities, entangled presences, more-than-human actants and contexts, bodies and affects, and difference/'diffraction' in producing space and collectivity. (shrink)

The relatively plentiful sources for the year 346 pose several questions which have never been satisfactorily answered. Why did Philip insist on an alliance with Athens as a precondition of the peace ? Did Demosthenes simply invent the promises of Philip which he claims Aeschines reported to the Athenian assembly in Skirophorion? Why were the Athenians frightened when Philip got control of Thermopylae? They had long expected him to settle the Sacred War, and such action surely required occupation of the (...) pass. The correct answer to these questions indicates that Philip had two alternative plans in 346. ‘Plan A’ was with the aid of the Athenians to turn on Thebes. By this move, he would reduce the power of the second greatest city in Greece and thus eliminate the possibility of a combination of Athens and Thebes, which might be sufficiently powerful to block his ambitions. (shrink)

The relatively plentiful sources for the year 346 pose several questions which have never been satisfactorily answered. Why did Philip insist on an alliance with Athens as a precondition of the peace? Did Demosthenes simply invent the promises of Philip which he claims Aeschines reported to the Athenian assembly in Skirophorion? Why were the Athenians frightened when Philip got control of Thermopylae? They had long expected him to settle the Sacred War, and such action surely required occupation of the pass. (...) The correct answer to these questions indicates that Philip had two alternative plans in 346. ‘Plan A’ was with the aid of the Athenians to turn on Thebes. By this move, he would reduce the power of the second greatest city in Greece and thus eliminate the possibility of a combination of Athens and Thebes, which might be sufficiently powerful to block his ambitions. (shrink)

Karen Barad develops a view she calls ‘posthumanism,’ or ‘agential realism,’ where the human is reconfigured away from the central place of explanation, interpretation, intelligibility, and objectivity to make room for the epistemic importance of other material agents. Barad is not alone in this kind of endeavor, but her posthumanism offers a unique epistemological position. Her aim is to take a performative rather than a representationalist approach to analyzing ‘socialnatural’ practices and challenge methodological assumptions that may go unnoticed in some (...) disciplinary fields. Yet for all the good of the challenge, Barad must support it with sound epistemological theorizing, theorizing that would apply to any methodology, whether that be sociological, historical, anthropological, or philosophical. Thus, where one might critique Barad on her assessments of sociological, historical, or anthropological incorporations of humans and the nonhuman, I critique Barad’s epistemology on its sense of objectivity and dismissal of the centrality of the human. I argue that Barad’s epistemology must retain a particular form of humanism, a humanism that stakes human subjectivity as the locus of rationality and objectivity, without which it creates intractable problems. To recuperate Barad’s challenge to contest assumptive distinctions while avoiding her epistemological problems, I offer some parting reflections. (shrink)

There is a tendency, a bad tendency, to make epistemic agency the central focus of epistemology. In brief, epistemologists have traditionally elevated epistemic agency as the crucial issue to be addressed, and ask all other epistemological questions in light of that issue. This is not surprising given the Cartesian influence on epistemology, but I argue that epistemic agency should not always be the central focus of epistemology. There are times when giving central place to epistemic agency gets in the way (...) of good epistemology. In this paper, I show how one approach to a communitarian epistemology falters precisely because of the primacy given to epistemic agency. Specifically, I take a close look at Lynn Hankinson Nelson?s notion of epistemological communities in terms of epistemic agency and analyze both its merits and its shortcomings. This is an important analysis for general consideration given the trend in non-traditional epistemologies to look towards social complexes as the real seats of knowledge. But this is also important because my analysis pushes one to consider an alternative framing concept for epistemology?that of epistemic practises instead of epistemic agency. (shrink)

Sri Aurobindo Ghose , the Indian Nationalist and yogi, developed in the period of his life at Pondicherry in Southeast India a system of thought, practice and experience which he called ‘Integral Yoga’. The title indicated, he said, that ‘it takes up the essence and many processes of the old Yogas — its newness is in its aim, standpoint and the totality of its method’. In the development of Integral Yoga Aurobindo believed he was speaking and acting as a ‘realized (...) yogi’ or, better still, a yogi who was in the process of realization. He had not attained a final experience of jñāna , but he believed he had experienced levels of supra-mental consciousness which would lead to the higher level of Supermind itself. (shrink)

Study on the thought and activities of a mystic philosopher of India.

In 1942, American Nobel Prize-winning physicist Arthur Compton pointed out that, “Because in this field of cosmic ray studies certain unique advantages are given by their geographical position, this field of physics has been especially emphasized in South America.” This paper seeks to interrogate the making of Latin America's uniqueness with respect to cosmic-ray research through an analysis that considers Compton's geographical argument, but also goes beyond it, referring to the interactions of nature, knowledge, practices, scientific communities, and diplomacy. To (...) begin with, it highlights the place-based strategies and practices associated with cosmic-ray research. Once research in the field at different altitudes demonstrated that cosmic rays traveled from outer space to the Earth surface, their nature was scrutinized by expeditions that covered broad vertical and horizontal expanses. The study of cosmic rays in Latin America displayed the mobilization of that strategy, which reinforced the reliability of certain sites located at high altitudes and close to the geomagnetic equator in projected investigations. Moreover, such analysis of cosmic rays involved research practices in the field, the emergence of (local, regional, or international) research traditions, and the creation of spaces of knowledge at different scales. By centering on the interaction of knowledge and place, this paper shows that an exploration of the “up-and-down journeys” of cosmic-ray research in Latin America expands our understanding of the geographies and practices of 20th-century physics. (shrink)

Barry Barnes and David Bloor of the Strong Programme of the sociology of knowledge advance a naturalized epistemology that reduces all accounts of normativity to social causes. I endorse their program of naturalizing one kind of normativity, but I argue that there is another kind they cannot naturalize. Within the context of sociological explanations of rationality, there are norms of rationality instantiated by scientists that Barnes and Bloor study, and Barnes and Bloor's own normative ascriptions of scientists as rational beings. (...) I argue that Barnes and Bloor successfully justify their naturalization of the norms of rationality of the scientists they describe by a methodological caution and arguments from under-determination and finitism. But they inevitably fail to naturalize their own normative ascriptions of those scientists as rational. (shrink)

Second Life is a free, three-dimensional, multi-user, online virtual world program created in 2003 by Linden Research Inc. In this paper, I recount the Introduction to Philosophy course I taught in Second Life for the University of Wisconsin-Whitewater and address five areas of interest: (1) traditional vs. non-traditional learning environments, (2) communication, (3) illustrative props, (4) student feedback, and (5) and potential concerns. My conclusion is that philosophy courses can be taught online in Second Life effectively and that philosophy instructors (...) need to be more aware of the educational possibilities of Second Life as education becomes increasingly more digital. (shrink)

Atension exists in Foucault’s writings concerning his alleged antihumanism. While his early archaeological period is taken to sediment his post-structuralist, anti-humanist methodology, Foucault still lets humanism creep into his writing, particularly in his later work. In the spirit of charity, I consider two ways of reading Foucault to overcome this tension: either emphasize his post-structuralism over his humanist leanings or take his humanism seriously and minimize his post-structuralism. After analysis, neither reading is adequate. I conclude that Foucault’s oeuvre is best (...) understood simply as incongruent, contrary to his own remarks to unify his writings and methodologies. (shrink)

Humanism is blurry. It can have some clarity, but it is mainly blurry. To say anything otherwise is to fool oneself. Yes, we can construct reasonable humanistic theories that attempt to organize our understanding, such as methodologicalhumanism where one unifies discourses or practices according to human subjects or substantivehumanism that touts the importance of humanity via some shared attribute or substance. But to suggest that one can delineate and define the full salience of humanity, whether great or small, in the (...) world we live and understand is to suppose a divine clarity that eludes our possession. Theorists use terms like ‘social causes,’ ‘matter,’ ‘construction,’ and ‘interpretation’ to help us figure out how our cognition and rationality work, and yet they woefully fail to capture the richness of our experiences, which blur distinctions between society and matter all the time. Every account of humanism should take stock of this difficulty, being careful to say only what one. (shrink)

Realism about the external world enjoys little philosophical support these days. I rectify this predicament by taking a relatively pragmatist line of thought to defend commonsense realism; I support commonsense realism through an interpretation and application of Donald Davidson’s notion of triangulation, the triangle composed of two communicators coordinating and correcting their responses with a shared causal stimulus. This argument is important because it has a crucial advantage over the often used abductive argument for realism. My argument avoids unwarranted conclusions, (...) whereas the abductive argument is “inflationary” because it reaches beyond the limits of evidence for its realist conclusion. To illustrate the problems of the abductive argument and motivate my Davidsonian approach, I take a brief look at the abductive argument for realism in Frederick Will’s work. (shrink)

Jean-Paul Sartre is known for his analysis of human consciousness. Surprisingly, however, he never takes seriously what it might mean to theorize God’s existence through that same understanding of consciousness. In this paper, I endeavor that analysis and outline the Sartrean conscious God, where nothingness haunts God’s own being. My argument is not to prove God’s existence through a Sartrean theology. My argument is only that a Sartrean theology centered on the conscious God is fully consistent within Sartre’s existentialism and (...) that such a conception of God should appeal to the Christian. (shrink)

In Heidi Grasswick?s response to ??Epistemological communities? and the problem of epistemic agency,? she criticizes my move to reconceptualize epistemology as an affair primarily centered on epistemic practises instead of epistemic agency. In this paper, I address some of Grasswick?s counterpoints, and I restate my argument for why epistemology should be centered on practises instead of epistemic agency. However, to advance the discussion, I urge that a more fruitful dialogue would engage looking at what consequences and advantages might follow from (...) reframing epistemology around practises. Therefore, I entertain an additional advantage this turn to practises makes regarding the danger of apriorism, the prior construction and application of theoretical structures upon groups of people and their practises without consideration for the actuality of these people and their practises. I argue that reorientating one?s epistemology around practises gives adequate grounds to avoid aprioristic tendencies, whereas an epistemology primarily centered on epistemic agency can fall into trouble. (shrink)

Many work on flushing out what our consciousness means in cognitive and phenomenological terms, but no one has yet connected the dots on how consciousness and truth intersect, much less how our phenomenal consciousness can form the ground for most of our models of truth. Here, I connect those dots and argue that the basic structure of our phenomenal consciousness grounds the nature of truth as concordance, to harmonize in agreement, and that most extant theories on truth are well explained (...) in that grounding. Said another way, the unifying and bifurcating intentional structure of phenomenal consciousness is the non-epistemic ground of truth, such that most theories of truth can be explained as particular expressions of concordance based upon the differing aspects of that ground. (shrink)

Discutir con los amigos es fácil. Es más difícil discutir con quien no comparte nuestros valores íntimos y preciados, con quien ofende nuestras creencias, deshonra nuestra fe y esperanza o se ríe de nuestras opiniones. ¿Cómo se ha de actuar en estos casos? ¿Con la espada y la ira en la mano, la indiferencia y el silencio, o el argumento y la palabra? ¿Y si no se puede ya razonar? ¿Cuando uno topa con el límite insalvable de la impotencia de (...) la razón se ha de acudir entonces a la potencia de la brutalidad? ¿Se puede, en breve, discutir con el “enemigo”? Este trabajo es un intento teoréticofilosófico por pensar analíticamente, modos de responder a estos interrogantes. Se busca examinar los límites, posibilidades y confines de la libertad de expresión, vista desde una teoría realista de la argumentación y de la pragmática del discurso normativo. Como ejemplos explicativos se toman conflictos generados por los grupos radicales, las sectas religiosas, los movimientos sociales violentos, entre otros. (shrink)